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ABSTRACT: Market deployment of lignocellulosic ethanol requires practical and plausible development paths that 
are able to support progress from existing small-scale demonstration plant to large industrial installations. Moreover, 
these development paths must be sufficiently attractive to persuade developers and investors that this technology 
remains an opportunity worth pursuing. This paper explores the opinions and practices of companies (and other 
market actors) who are pursuing lignocellulosic ethanol technology in the context of the academic literature on 
innovation. The premise that underpins the analysis is that the decisions that these actors make, and their appraisal of 
the potential offered, will, at least in the short term, determine the path to market. We conclude that corporate interest 
in lignocellulosic ethanol is principally driven by the desire to expand upon existing business assets or acumen. 
Market dominance is expected to come from privileged access to feedstocks and vertical integration. Large scale LE 
plants are largely regarded as hypothetical. The most credible paths to market (at least in the short term) are 
considered to be intermediate scale facilities, closely integrated with other industrial processes such as CHP, district 
heating, or conventional ethanol production. 
Keywords: ethanol, lignocellulose, biofuel, market, demonstration, project development. 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
The cost effective production of transport fuels from 
biomass is essential if the EU aspiration to substitute 10% 
of transport fuels with sustainable alternatives by 2020 is 
to be met [2]. The hope, voiced by the Parliament’s 
Industry and Energy Committee, is that at least 40% of 
the 2020 target will come from second-generation 
biofuels, and therein lies a challenge: second-generation 
conversion technologies are not yet commercial. Multiple 
pathways are being investigated around the globe, but 
dominant pathways have yet to emerge and business 
models have yet to be proven. Nevertheless, expectations 
are running high and there has been significant 
investment in R&D in the US, Europe and Asia.  
The production of ethanol from lignocellulosic 
biomass is commercially and environmentally one of the 
most promising second-generation options, and in 2007 
the US Department of Energy (DOE) provided more than 
US$1 billion toward lignocellulosic ethanol (LE) 
projects. Their goal was to make the fuel cost competitive 
at $1.33 per gallon, when deployed at scale, by 2012. The 
majority of studies also suggest that LE will result in 
superior greenhouse gas savings compared to ethanol 
produced from starch.  
Despite favourable predictions for cost and 
environmental performance, market deployment requires 
practical and plausible development paths that are able to 
support progress from existing small-scale demonstration 
plant to large industrial installations. Moreover, these 
development paths must be sufficiently attractive to 
persuade developers and investors that LE remains an 
opportunity worth pursuing. For a pre-commercial 
technology such as lignocellulosic ethanol the path to 
market is inherently speculative [1]. Yet, many of the 
market agents who might be expected to play a role along 
the development path are already in place, including 
technology developers, feedstock suppliers, potential 
investors, government agencies etc. The premise that 
underpins this analysis is that the decisions that these 
agents make, and their appraisal of the potential offered 
by LE, will, at least in the short term, determine the path 
to market.  
This paper is presented in 2 parts. The first part 
reviews the key concepts to be found in the academic 
literature on innovation. The second part explores the 
opinions and practices of existing market actors and 
thereby builds a picture of the options available, the 
decisions taken, and the underlying reasons for these 
decisions.  
 
 
2 PART 1: INNOVATION THEORY  
 
Developing, demonstrating and commercialising LE 
production demands both specific technical 
improvements and systemic technological change. Yet, 
the actions that companies and policy makers need to 
take in order to make these improvements and stimulate 
change are not necessarily unique. Comparable measures 
may be required to advance other early stage 
technologies, both in the area of renewable energy and 
more broadly in fields as diverse as pharmaceuticals and 
consumer electronics. Innovation theory is, in essence, 
the body of knowledge gleaned from previous attempts to 
commercialise technology and stimulate change. 
There is a large body of literature on innovation, 
which can be divided into three main strands: (i) 
innovation as a strategic management issue; (ii) models 
of technological diffusion; and, (iii) innovation as a 
systemic process. Yet, innovation is something of a catch 
all term. It is usually differentiated from invention 
(defined as the first discovery of new product or 
processes [3]) but may be used interchangeably with 
technological change to describe the steps required to get 
the new product to market. Innovation may be classified 
as incremental, radical, or disruptive [4] [5] depending 
upon whether it originates within, or outside, the 
mainstream. It may also refer to a new product itself, to a 
stage in a product’s lifecycle [1], or to an iterative 
process of invention, and application that links technical, 
societal and political change [6]. A concise introduction 
to innovation is provided by Foxon [7]. For our purpose, 
no specific definition of innovation is required. It can be 
taken in one of the original senses: innovation is simply 
“getting a new thing done” [3]. 
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Commercialisation, arguably the endpoint of the 
innovation process, is similarly nebulous. There is no 
single definition of commercial, nor is it clear whether 
being commercial necessitates the absence of subsidies. 
The dictionary definition is simply ‘able to yield or make 
a profit’. A more comprehensive definition used by the 
United Nations Environment Programme is as follows:  
‘Commercialisation means that the 
manufacture and sale [of a renewable energy 
technology] is a profit driven process in that the 
income derived (which may or may not include 
subsidies) is sufficient to make it a worthwhile 
activity for the entrepreneur’ [8] 
Whether an activity is ‘worthwhile […] for the 
entrepreneur’ depends upon the judgements made by 
investors: the size of the investment, the opportunity cost, 
its perceived risk etc. The inclusion of both subsidised 
and unsubsidised markets in the definition also 
acknowledges that it may be socially or politically 
desirable to support particular activities, for example, 
those that reduce GHG emissions or internalise other 
externalities.  
2.1 Innovation in the strategic management literature 
The strategic management literature focuses on 
companies decision making processes and seeks to build 
a bottom-up picture of a firm’s individual behaviour of in 
the face of technological change. It is underpinned by 
four fundamental concepts: bounded rationality, 
organisational routines, capabilities and strategy. 
Bounded rationality holds that companies are rational 
economic actors constrained by limitations of 
information availability, computational capacity, and 
time [9]. In the face of the uncertainty and imperfect 
foresight that this entails, companies rely upon 
organisational routines to simplify and make decisions 
[10]. Examples of organisational routines (which are 
simply dominant forms of behaviour) include training 
managers to reject any project that does not deliver a 
minimum financial return, or to reject new ventures that 
are small in relation to the size of the original company 
[11]. Organisational routines are also determined by a 
firm’s history and capabilities. History is important 
because routines that have benefited the company 
previously are likely to be refined with the benefit of 
experience (learning by doing) [12 ] and so may become 
entrenched. Capabilities are the unique combinations of 
resources and competencies that distinguish a firm from 
its competitors [13], and includes tacit knowledge in 
addition to tangible and intangible assets. At least in the 
short run, capabilities tend to be difficult to replicate and 
can form the basis of a firm’s competitive advantage.  
Like innovation, strategy is another broad concept. A 
traditional definition holds that strategy is deliberate: the 
“determination of basic long-term goals and objectives of 
an enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and 
the allocation of resources necessary for carrying out 
these goals” [14]. Subsequent researchers, however, have 
recognised that strategy can emerge out of unintended 
and undirected actions that have coalesced over time to 
become the dominant pathway for a firm [12]. A 
distinction can therefore be made between deliberate and 
emergent strategies [15]. An alternative and more 
functional view of strategy is that, whether deliberate or 
emergent, its purpose is to position a firm in the market 
in order to make it defensible against competition. Five 
determinants of competition, or forces, are widely 
recognised. These are the bargaining power of customers 
and suppliers, the threat of new entrants and substitute 
products, and the level of competition in the industry 
[16]. To position itself against these forces, a firm may 
seek to build new capabilities (to innovate), or find 
niches in the market in which to exploit its existing 
capabilities. Examples of strategic choices include: 
becoming a cost leader, seeking to differentiate products 
in the eyes of customers, moving out of a highly 
competitive markets, etc. If a defensible position within 
the existing market cannot be found, another option 
remains: lobbying government to change the rules so that 
competition is reduced or so that existing capabilities can 
be exploited more profitably. Corporate political activity, 
undertaken to effect such change, may include lobbying, 
advocacy, financial contributions to political parties, 
constituency building, etc.  
The interaction between strategy, organisational 
routines and capabilities is essentially dynamic. As a 
company pursues its strategy in the marketplace it will 
gain experience that will enable it to extend its 
capabilities and modify its routines. This relationship is 
summarised in Figure 1.  
The strategic management literature thus describes a 
framework for analysing a firm’s decisions, and provides 
a rationale for firms to innovate: investments in R&D 
(and learning by working) make sense because new 
technologies can improve a firm’s competitive position. 
Investments in new technology may also provide a hedge 
against uncertain and unforeseen risks [1]. The limitation 
of the strategic management approach is that the 
diffusion of a new technology involves numerous firms 
with different capabilities pursuing diverse strategies. 
Whilst the management literature helps identify the 
options available, for any individual firm, the decisions 
that result in the selection of technology, or the selection 
of a particular strategy,  are often so numerous and 
complicated that they cannot be modelled individually 
(ibid). This limitation is to some extent addressed by 
technology diffusion models and systemic studies of 
innovation.  
 
Capabilities
Routines
Strategy Experience / learning
 
Adapted from [17] 
 
Figure 1: An organisational learning framework for 
strategy making 
 
2.2 Technological diffusion models and experience 
curves 
Historically, technologies entering and exiting the 
market have displayed characteristic patterns of diffusion, 
substitution and senescence, which can be described 
using S-curves. The classic example is the substitution of 
horse drawn carriages by motor cars in the USA, shown 
in Figure 2. Because the basic patterns diffusion and 
substitution are largely invariant across a wide range of 
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different examples [1], stylised models of technological 
evolution may be developed. These models characterise 
technological lifecycles into stages according to the 
technology cost, market share and learning rate. One such 
characterisation scheme is shown in Table 1.  
 
Fraction of 
total number 
of road 
vehicles
Year
Source: Nakicenovic in [1] 
 
Figure 2: The substitution of horse drawn carriages by 
motor cars 
 
Although the patterns of diffusion (substitution) 
appear invariant, neither the maximum extent of diffusion 
(or substitution) nor the time constant ∆t – the time taken 
to grow from 10 to 90% market share – can be 
determined from historic data. Nor can diffusion models 
fully explain which technologies attract investment. 
Nonetheless, diffusion models are useful heuristics for 
technology modelling and historic observations can help 
guide the selection of an appropriate ∆t: the greater the 
scale, infrastructure requirements and technical 
interdependence, and the lower the relative advantage 
over the incumbent technology, the longer ∆t is likely to 
be.  
Similar to technical diffusion models, the concept of 
experience (learning) curves originates from empirical 
observations of technological change, and specifically the 
observation that technology unit costs often decrease at a 
more or less fixed rate (the progress ratio (PR)) with 
every doubling of cumulative production.  This idea was 
incorporated into mainstream economic literature by 
Arrow [18] in a review of ‘the economic implications of 
learning by doing’, but was first observed and 
documented in 1936 in relation to the efficiency of air 
frame production [19]. The concept has been widely 
applied to the manufacturing sector [20] and an overview 
of its application to energy technologies is given by 
McDonald and Schrattenholzer [21].  
The experience curve principle is attractively simple 
but a number of methodological issues arise in its 
application. In particular: (i) production costs are difficult 
to determine, market prices are often used as a surrogate 
but this may introduce additional variables (e.g. the affect 
of advertising campaigns etc.); and, (ii) cumulative 
output is often used as a substitute for accumulated 
experience [22]. It is also important to bear in mind the 
underlying reasons why cost reductions may occur. 
Factors may include: (i) learning by doing, (ii) innovation 
and R&D, (iii) standardisation, (iv) economies of scale 
and redesign, (v) improved network interactions [23]. 
These methodological issues, and the importance of 
avoiding double counting when using learning curves in 
combination with other analytical approaches, suggest 
that long term projections of learning rates should be 
treated with caution. 
Notable applications of experience curves to bio-
energy technologies in the academic literature include the 
documentation of the Brazilian ethanol learning rate 
 
Source : [1]. 
 
Table 1:  Stylised stages of technological development and typical characteristics 
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during the PROALCOOL program [24]. This programme 
was established in 1975 and the progress ratio was found 
to be 93% from 1980-85, and 71% from 1985-2002. In a 
much more detailed assessment, Junginger et al. 
investigated the potential for technological learning and 
cost reductions in Swedish wood fuel supply-chains [23].  
This study concluded that the cost of primary forest fuel 
(PFF) (slash and treetops) decreased following a learning 
curve from 1975-2003, over nine successive doublings of 
production, with a progress ratio of around 85%. Specific 
areas of the supply-chain where cost reductions were 
observed included: (i) felling costs - increased awareness 
reduced contamination with rocks and mud; (ii) 
forwarding costs – increased experience and improved 
equipment; (iii) Chipping costs – technical improvement 
and increased reliability of chippers. One interesting 
observation was that net transportation costs remained 
stable suggesting that cost reductions may be exhausted 
in this area. 
2.3 Innovation as a systemic process 
One of the criticisms of dividing the innovation 
process into stylised stages has been that it fosters the 
notion that innovation is a linear process that starts with 
R&D [7]. The countervailing view is that innovation is a 
system wide process that transcends changes in 
technological artefacts to include changes in wider socio-
economic structures and institutions [12,47]. This second 
view holds that the innovation and diffusion process is 
“an individual and collective act […] the determinants of 
which are not only found in firms [because] firms are 
embedded in innovation systems that aid and constrain 
the individual actors within them” [25]. Systems models 
of the innovation process are typically conceptualised in 
terms of components and functions.  
Components include: 
• actors (firms / innovative entities / agents); 
• interactions between firms (linkages / 
networks); and, 
• the context in which the firms operate 
(institutional framework). 
Functions include:  
• the creation and diffusion of new knowledge; 
• guidance of the direction of search among users 
and suppliers, 
• the supply of resources such as capital and 
competencies; 
• the creation of positive external economies; 
and, 
• the formation of markets [26] 
Such models are highly abstract. They have also 
been criticised for leaving little room for individual 
agency [27] and for failing to explain the actions of 
entrepreneurs [28]. Nevertheless, systems models can 
play an important role in the commercialisation process, 
for once a systemic failure has been identified it can 
serve as a platform to argue for public support.  
 
 
3 PART 2: IDENTIFYING THE NEXT STEPS ON THE PATH TO 
MARKET  
3.1  Methodology 
The scope of this investigation was limited to 
companies that claimed to be developing, 
commercialising or investing in, technology for the 
conversion of lignocellulosic biomass to liquid biofuels 
during the period January 2008 – April 2009. Target 
companies included those developing catalytic and 
gasification technologies, in addition to companies 
pursuing ethanol production via the hydrolysis and 
fermentation pathway.  
Empirical data was obtained from two sources: 
presentations by companies at specialist conferences and 
semi-structured interviews conducted using a 
standardised interview scheme. These sources were 
supplemented with information gathered from the 
companies’ websites. Gathering information from 
conferences on the commercialisation of second 
generation biofuels provided breadth, enabling data on a 
large number of companies to be collected rapidly, while 
at the same time permitting questions and discussion. 
Semi-structured interviews provided depth, enabling a 
more complete exploration of the subject with more full 
responses [29] [30,p316]. Combining the information 
sources had two advantages. Firstly, information gained 
from conference presentations helped inform the 
development of the interview scheme. They also 
provided a means of evaluating its completeness, as 
pertinent issues that arose during company presentations 
could be indentified, included in the scheme and followed 
up in subsequent interviews. Secondly, attending 
conferences provided a means of identifying and making 
contact with potential interviewees. 
The structured interview explored four themes.  
• What was company’s current experience with 
second generation biofuels, the rationale behind 
their current strategy, and the applicability of 
current experience to LE? 
• What would persuade companies to investigate 
further, to invest in LE technology and, if they 
were to make an investment, how would they 
go about it? 
• How might the commercial opportunities be 
realised? 
• What else needs to be done, and who needs to 
do it?  
Specific questions were then grouped under each of 
these themes. The final interview scheme is shown in 
Figure 3. To encourage free discussion, the interviewees 
were offered the opportunity to remain anonymous; 
around half elected to take this option. 
 
3.2 Limitations, subjectivity and bias.  
In seeking to explore the path to market for LE 
through the perspectives and opinions of existing 
companies, a number of assumptions are implicit: that 
companies can be identified, that their opinions and 
decisions can be accurately discerned, and that generic 
lessons can thereby be induced. Other limitations and 
potential sources of bias which need to be borne in mind 
in the subsequent analysis include the following issues.  
• Companies pursuing second generation 
biofuels inevitably seek to cast their activities 
and decisions in a positive light. One of the 
prime motivations for self promotion is to seek 
investment, participation in conferences may 
also form part of a companies political, or 
lobbying strategy. 
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• Companies that have looked at second 
generation biofuels and decided to take no 
action are invariably harder to identify. 
• Commercial confidentiality limits what 
companies are willing to disclose. As a 
technology moves closer to market, less 
information is typically forthcoming.  
• A company’s intentions and strategy are 
dynamic, they will be adapted by the company 
to reflect the changing environment. During 
2008/9 the policy context, investment 
environment, and oil price have all changed 
dramatically.  
• The focus on companies as the principle market 
actors is also limiting. It may be argued that 
policy makers have a central role in setting the 
context and that environmental lobby has been 
pivotal in setting the political agenda.  
The methodology is thus inherently subjective and 
can only provide a limited snapshot of a moving picture. 
Despite these limitations and caveats, the empirical data 
gathered is nonetheless informative, and in the absence of 
techniques for perfect forecasting, provides a basis for 
critical discussion. 
3.3 Categorising and targeting companies and 
interviewees 
A stakeholder mapping exercise, undertaken within 
the NILE project identified over 120 companies 
developing lignocellulosic biofuel technology globally. 
These companies are very diverse, not only in terms of 
their size, capabilities, and the part of the supply-chain in 
which they operate, but also whether second generation 
biofuels is a peripheral or core activity. In order to target 
a representative spread of company types and 
interviewees across the supply-chain, a classification 
scheme was developed, based on one used by one of the 
independent oil companies interviewed. This scheme 
makes a direct analogy between biofuel and fossil fuel 
supply-chains. Accordingly, companies are classified as 
either upstream, mid-stream, downstream, or investor, as 
follows: 
• upstream companies are defined as those that 
focus on feedstock supply, logistics and the 
development of enabling technologies such as 
new plant varieties and germplasm;  
• mid-stream companies are those that focus on 
the conversion process including pre-treatment, 
biochemical and thermochemical pathways as 
well as the development and supply of 
enzymes; 
• downstream companies are those that focus on 
trading, blending and distribution, traditionally 
a role played by the oil companies; and,  
• investors may be independent – banks, venture 
capitalists, etc. – or they may include the 
companies themselves, seeking to either expand 
their own capabilities or make strategic 
investments outside their core area of expertise.  
Interviewees are listed in Table 2. 
 
Interviewee 
details/label 
Company description and classification 
(U=upstream; M=mid-stream; 
D=downstream; I=investor) 
Simon Wilcox 
CEO 
Greenspirit fuels 
 
13-12-07 
 (M) Greenspirit Fuels (GSF) A farmer 
owned company specialising in grain 
storage and trading. GSF was set up with 
the aim of pursuing alternative markets for 
grain 
Claus Hirzman- 
Project Manager 
Mondi Business 
Paper 
19-2-08 
(U) Mondi Business Paper a leading 
manufacturer of high quality low-chlorine 
and chlorine-free paper 
Dr Steven Martin 
Associate R&D 
Director 
TMO Renewables 
22-2-08 
(M) TMO Renewables is a venture capital 
backed, pre IPO, company, developing 
novel LE technology using thermophilic 
micro-organisms 
IOC#1 
24-6-08 
 
(D) An international oil company (IOC) 
The interviewee was a member of the 
bioenergy team. 
 
Jan Lindstedt 
CEO Sekab Industrial 
(M) Part of the SEKAB Group, Sekab 
Industrial Development seeks to 
• What needs to 
happen for LCE  
to make the 
transition from 
demonstration 
to commercial 
reality?
• To what extent can 
experience with 
current technology 
(inc. 1st gen 
biofuels) inform 
LCE development 
and scale-up? 
• What is your current experience 
and strategy?
•What is driving your interest in 
biofuels?
•What role do you anticipate 
having – producer, developer , 
licenser?
•What relationships do you have 
with technology developers 
• What would 
persuade you to 
investigate further  / 
invest in LCE?
• What have you learnt from 
current experience, and how 
would it apply to LCE?
• What work have you done on 
LCE to date?
• What were the conclusions?
• What are next steps?
• How would you go about this? 
• How can the 
commercial 
opportunities be 
realised? 
• What are the most/least 
promising areas and why?
• What barriers need to be 
overcome?
• How may this be achieved?
• What business models are most 
attractive?
• What else needs to 
be done & who 
needs to do it?
• Who is best placed to invest in 
LCE technology?
• What can they hope to achieve?
•What is you experience working 
with: 
•Feedstocks?
•Conversion plant / technology?
•Markets?
•Infrastructure?
•Finance?
•Policy?
•Social / environmental issues?
 
 
Figure 3: The path to market: research question breakdown, interview structure and questions. 
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Development 
25-6-08 
commercialise research on lignocellulosic 
ethanol  
IOC#2 
25-6-08 
 
(D) ) An international oil company (IOC) 
and major European fossil and biofuel 
trader and distributor. The interviewee was 
director responsible for assessing new 
business ventures including biofuels 
Michael Deutmeyer 
Managing Director 
CHOREN Biomass 
8-7-08 
(M) CHOREN a German gasification 
company  
Harry Boyle 
Lead Analyst, 
Biofuels 
New Energy Finance 
8-1-09 
(I) New Energy Finance (NEF) is a 
specialist provider of information and 
research to investors in renewable energy, 
low-carbon technology and the carbon 
markets 
IOC#3 
16-1-09 
 
(D) An international oil company (IOC). 
The interviewee was a member of the 
bioenergy team. 
Ethanol marketing 
manager 
16-1-09 
(M) Ethanol marketing manager at a 
leading European ethanol blender and 
distributor  
 
Table 2: Individuals and companies who participated in a 
semi-structured interview 
 
Comments made during interviews, where permission 
was given, are attributed to the interviewee. Where an 
interviewee elected to remain anonymous, the name of 
the interviewee and company are disguised. Comments 
made in a public forum during presentations are 
attributed to the person who made the presentation. It 
should be emphasised in general that the views expressed 
should be taken to represent the views of the individual 
and not the company.  
 
 
4 RESULTS, SYNTHESIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This section gathers together the views expressed by 
companies, investors and other interested parties during 
interviews and presentations. These views are grouped in 
a structure that loosely reflects the interview structure: 
motivations for investing in biofuels, investment 
strategies and business model, and insights from 
experience working with LE supply-chains. Assembling 
and comparing these different perspectives, however, it 
becomes immediately apparent that in a number of areas 
there is significant overlap that verges on consensus. It is 
useful to present these here as they can be taken as a 
common basis for the synthesis that follows: 
• the second generation biofuels industry is 
embryonic, there is no dominant 
technological paradigm, and it is unclear 
whether a dominant paradigm will emerge 
over the next 5-7 years; 
• access to feedstocks and the problems 
inherent in demonstration and scale-up 
present a significant challenge to the future 
development of the industry; and, 
• public policy and the availability of private 
finance for technology development are 
inextricably linked. 
The following viewpoint, expressed by the president 
of a joint venture between Dupont and Danisco that was 
set up to develop cellulosic biofuels, echoes many of 
these sentiments, and can be taken to be broadly 
representative:  
 “The industry is still very much in its infancy. 
Someone needs to come to the table with an 
economically viable solution. And that will not be 
just a technical solution; it needs to go all the 
way back to the field. To ensure that everyone is 
making a return along the value chain, and that 
throughout the entire value chain people are able 
to make a justifiable return for the risk they are 
taking and the alternative options that they are 
giving up. 
If you have a technology package that is 
ready to go, the question is – how does that 
package fit within the marketplace? And the key 
to that marketplace is the cost of feedstocks and 
the price of ethanol. You have to make sure the 
cost of biomass is low enough whilst is still 
providing a return to growers. To keep the cost of 
biomass low we will need incentives across the 
value chain.” [31] (Skurla, J., president, Dupont 
Danisco Joint Venture).  
4.1 Motivations for investing in LC biofuels 
What motivates companies? Examining the strategies 
and actions of companies pursuing lignocellulosic 
biofuels reveals three broad motivations for interest and 
investment: the potential for a large market and rapid 
market growth, the potential to increase the profitability 
of existing operations, and the potential to profitably 
exploit existing capabilities. For larger companies the 
size of the market is a fundamental consideration. There 
are divergent views as to how the market will develop, 
but the key point is that it is expected to be sufficiently 
big to make strategic investments worthwhile, even for 
the larger companies. A view succinctly expressed in 
relation to the paper company UPM’s decision to pursue 
biofuels: 
“The strategic question for UPM is how to 
make a profitable and significant business: i.e. on 
some time horizon there needs to be a prospect of 
a 1bn turnover business… even the most 
pessimistic estimates put the market for biofuels 
at ~100bn euro by 2020.” [32] (Sohlstrom, H., 
Executive vice president new businesses and 
biofuels, UPM). 
The size of the market size relative to the size of the 
company is also an important consideration for the 
international oil companies:  
“You have to look at what we do from the 
perspective that [we] are a very big company. If 
something is not big then it has no impact on our 
scale.” (Interview:  IOC 1). 
For the smaller companies, although the size of the 
market in relation to the size of the company is unlikely 
to be a constraint, the potential for a large and growing 
market to develop is also frequently cited as evidence that 
pursuing lignocellulosic biofuels is worthwhile.  
The prospect of using lignocellulosic biofuels 
technology to increase the profitability of existing 
operations appeals primarily to mid-stream and up-stream 
companies. Existing ethanol producers, for example, 
describe themselves as motivated to develop and adopt 
technology that can add value to secondary process 
streams and residues such as distillers dried grains 
(DDG), stover and bagasse. This motivation is also 
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demonstrated by their proclaimed actions. Examples of 
companies seeking technology to convert DDG and 
agricultural residues include POET, the largest dry mill 
ethanol producer in the US [33], and Abengoa, the 
Spanish/American grain-to-ethanol producer [34]. 
Bagasse is also of interest and, according to the CEO of 
the Swedish ethanol company Sekab, the co-production 
of ethanol from bagasse at existing sugarcane plants 
provides the “lowest and largest of the low hanging fruit” 
{Carstedt, 2009 #281). 
More broadly, however, it can be seen that companies 
view the production of cellulosic biofuels as means to 
expand or increase profit margins, rather than an end it 
itself. The following comment from a UK company 
specialising in grain storage and seeking to build a 
conventional grain-to-ethanol plant illustrates this point: 
”The starting point was how can the value of 
our existing business be enhanced, not how can 
biofuels be provided.” (Interview: Wilcox, S., 
CEO, Greenspirit fuels). 
Although not primarily interested in lignocellulosic 
biofuels, the same company had nevertheless considered 
the role that they might play in the future:  
“Incorporating lignocellulosic materials [into 
an existing grain to ethanol plant] would be part 
of a risk mitigation strategy: broadening the 
feedstock base and reducing exposure to volatile 
grain markets. Essentially it would be good 
insurance against peaks in the grain market.” 
(Ibid). 
The paper company Mondi, although far bigger and 
operating in a completely different market, has similar 
priorities, emphasising the need to maximise the overall 
profitability, irrespective of the technology used and even 
the products produced: 
 “We need to look at what is the most value we 
can add to our feedstocks. Essentially we don’t 
care whether we make ethanol or paper. The only 
real criterion is profitability. We are not wedded 
to any particular production process.” 
(Interview: Hirzman, C., Mondi business paper). 
A last illustration of this point is provided by Dong 
Energy. Dong is a Danish electricity utility that co-fires 
straw in coal fired power plant and began developing a 
straw-to-ethanol technology after experimenting with 
washing straw in order to reduce boiler fouling. The 
motivation in their case was not the production of ethanol 
but the production of a solid biomass product that could 
be co-fired more easily:  
“In the US the talk is all about ethanol, but 
the production of lignin is the main driver for 
Dong” {Morgen, 2009 #282} (Morgen, C., Senior 
manager business development and marketing - 
Inbicon (Dong Energy)). 
The ability of downstream companies to use biofuels 
to increase the profitability of existing retail operations is 
more limited, and in a competitive market would 
ultimately depend on the arbitrage between the price of 
biofuels and the price of gasoline. Nevertheless, 
opportunities for arbitrage may arise:  
“Currently [January 2009], ethanol is above 
the gasoline price, but over the summer [2008], 
when the oil price was very high, oil companies 
were going beyond the mandates and selling a 
5% blend because ethanol was priced low 
compared to gasoline.” (Interview: Ethanol 
marketing manager). 
It also should be borne in mind that the market for 
ethanol is far from competitive and is influenced by 
political decisions, blending mandates, restrictions on the 
maximum proportion that may be blended etc. Selling 
ethanol may therefore be profitable, even if the price of 
ethanol is greater than gasoline.  
The potential to exploit existing capabilities, and in 
particular knowledge, appears to be a key feature in the 
decision making of smaller companies for whom the 
development and application of technology forms a 
significant part of their raison d’être. An example of such 
a company is the German gasification company, Choren:  
“The starting point of the company was 
gasification – the founders had knowledge of this 
technology and considered it one of the good 
ways of converting biomass. In this sense the 
company was technology driven rather than 
selecting the best approach from a range of 
options.” (Interview: Deutmeyer, M., Choren). 
A large number of the mid-stream technology 
developers might reasonably be viewed as similarly 
technologically driven. This focus may be deliberate – 
ring fencing potentially disruptive innovation in a 
subsidiary company is one of the management strategies 
proposed in the innovation literature [5]. Alternatively, it 
may simply reflect the technological capabilities which 
were available when the company was founded. In the 
UK, for example, there are three companies focusing on 
the application of thermophilic micro-organisms to 
biofuels: TMO Renewables, Green Biologics and 
Biocaldol. These companies share a common heritage 
and can trace their origins to the dissolution, in 2003, of a 
university spinout company called Agrol Ltd. Since 
going their separate ways, these companies have adopted 
divergent strategies: TMO is focussed on the production 
of ethanol from a broad range of lignocellulosic 
feedstocks [35], Biocaldol is focused on the production of 
ethanol from hemi-cellulose sugars [36], and Green 
Biologics is focussed on improving the acetone-butanol-
ethanol (ABE) fermentation [37]. All three companies, 
however, remain focussed on thermophiles. In line with 
what might be predicted from the strategic management 
literature, their current strategic direction appears to have 
been largely determined by their initial capabilities. 
 
What motivates investors? Whereas companies 
appear to derive motivation from their existing operations 
and capabilities, financial investors are motivated 
primarily by the potential for rapid market growth and are 
technologically agnostic. The amount of money that 
financiers are prepared to invest depends on their 
assessment of risk: the greater the risk, the less money 
will be forthcoming and the greater the return they will 
demand. What distinguishes an investment in a new 
production technology from a similar investment in an 
established technology is the level of technical risk. 
Venture capital (VC) investors are the finance providers 
most willing to accept this risk, but their acceptance 
comes at a price: they demand a higher return than other 
investors. Moreover, the size of a typical VC investment 
is small when compared to the investment required to 
build a pilot plant or demonstration facility:  
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“VCs don’t care whether the company makes 
chemicals or fuels provided that it has potential 
to grow. The fuel market is interesting because it 
is protected by policy. There are no equivalent 
policies for green chemicals.  
Investors are shy of demonstration projects. 
They are big and expensive. [Instead] Cleantech 
VCs have focussed on the biotech side: new 
bacteria, enzymes, fermentation processes etc. 
These are low cost companies, not much more 
than three scientists and a lab. Lab-scale 
technologies can also be sold on to the pipeline in 
order to realise an earlier return.” (Interview: 
Boyle. H.,, lead analyst, biofuels, New Energy 
Finance) 
For the venture capital investors, more important than 
picking a winning technology is picking a winning team:  
“technology is a commodity, what is more 
important is the ability to have the right kind of 
relationships. This is key.” [38] (Baruch, T., 
CMEA ventures). 
Advocates of specific technology may also be viewed 
with suspicion: 
“In general technology providers are 
enthusiasts. Take BlueFire Ethanol for example, 
they are using concentrated acid technology and 
have better acid recovery process.  They tell you 
that they are getting the feedstock for free; 
consequently the conversion process looks 
economic. But ultimately biomass will become a 
commodity.” (Interview: Boyle, H., lead analyst, 
biofuels, New Energy Finance) 
4.2 Strategies for investment and business development 
Strategies for investing in cellulosic biofuels. The 
strategic-management innovation literature suggests that 
a company’s choice of strategy for investing in LE – 
whether it should invest, how it should invest etc. – will 
be determined by the resources and capabilities that it has 
at its disposal. It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that 
the disparity in the resources available to the different 
companies interested in LE gives rise to a range of 
strategies. These can be crudely characterised as building 
a portfolio, picking a winner or keeping a watching brief.  
The oil companies are large enough to take a strategic 
view of both the market and the technology and build a 
portfolio of options. Like the financial investors they are 
demonstrably technology agnostic. Shell, for example, 
has invested in five companies spanning a range of 
technologies: Iogen – cellulosic ethanol via the enzymatic 
process; Choren – two stage biomass gasification 
combined with Fischer Tropsch synthesis; Codexis – a 
platform technology for enzyme production; Cellana – a 
join venture looking at marine algae; Virent Energy 
Systems – catalytic conversion of sugars to gasoline [39]. 
British Petroleum (BP) have also adopted a portfolio 
approach as part of a proclaimed strategy to “develop an 
upstream biofuels business” [40]. Investments made by 
BP include joint ventures with Verenium to develop 
commercialize LE and with Mendel Biotechnology to 
develop cellulosic bio-feedstocks [41].  
The paper companies, situated at the other end of the 
supply-chain to the oil companies, have a clear focus the 
efficient use of their existing resource base but are 
similarly open minded when it comes to identifying the 
most appropriate technology. They are also large enough 
to hedge their bets and invest in a technology portfolio. 
UPM for example, are pursuing three biofuel concepts: 
gasification of forest residues followed by Fisher 
Tropsch, pyrolysis of forest residues to produce bio-oil, 
and the production of ethanol from recycled fibre. [32].  
The build a portfolio option is unlikely to be 
available to smaller companies. These companies are 
limited in the strategies they can adopt by the resources 
that they can deploy. They are effectively forced to try 
and pick a winning option which will deliver near term 
results, even though they may be attracted to technologies 
they are unable to pursue:  
 “TMO’s proposition is to offer a thermophilic 
organism, process design, and process 
guarantee. Consolidated Bioprocessing is a 
wonderful vision, but we would run out of money 
long before we got there. Our work needs to 
generate a revenue stream as early as possible.” 
(Interview: Martin, S.,, associate R&D director, 
TMO Renewables) 
Notably, TMO’s original strategy was limited to the 
provision of a thermophilic ethanologen but was 
modified to better reflect potential customers’ demands:   
“We spoke to potential customers in the USA 
and no one was interested in the organism alone. 
This is because the system - pre-treatment, 
hydrolysis, fermentation is so interdependent. 
Consequently, TMO’s proposition has moved 
from licencing the organism to the whole 
system.” (Ibid) 
The keeping a watching brief option is a low cost 
strategy, but is not entirely passive. It requires a minimal 
investment in the skills and information needed to make 
an informed decision. There is also the risk that the cost 
of catching up may become prohibitive: 
“Essentially we wish to make an informed 
decision whether to be an early adopter, early 
follower or late follower. One option is to secure 
privileged access to feedstock and wait. The wait 
option gives insight on disruptive technology, but 
there is always the risk that the market settles. 
We need to position ourselves first.” (Interview: 
Hirzman, C., Mondi business paper). 
 
Another reason to keep a watching brief is because 
existing companies lack experience: 
“To start such a complex, large, process with 
young engineering companies is too risky. We 
have had problems before with biodiesel plant; 
the small companies are ambitious, but they don’t 
have the skills and experience to deliver. For [us] 
to invest we would need to see big, established, 
engineering companies offering proven, turnkey 
plant designs. For example Lurgi or UOP – who 
are the major engineering companies in the fuels 
business. Currently there are no engineering 
companies operating on a sound basis who can 
offer turnkey plant and tell us how well it can 
perform. Look at how much the US has spent in 
this area and no plants have been built. The 
industry lacks robust process designs but also the 
ability to handle the money.” (Interview: IOC#2)  
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Business models. For a company developing new 
technology for the production of lignocellulosic biofuels 
there are three principal business models: becoming a 
technology supplier, a component supplier, or an owner 
operator. The technology supplier model is a licensing 
model in which the technology developer offers a licence 
to a construction or production company in return for a 
royalty based on the ethanol produced. A company 
adopting the component supplier model would aim to 
manufacture and sell key components to other operators 
and plant developers. The owner operator model assumes 
that the company builds, owns and operates a production 
facility, selling ethanol (or other biofuels) and related 
products. 
The advantages and disadvantages of each approach 
have been considered by Dong Energy, in relation to the 
commercialisation of their own straw-to-ethanol process, 
but they are broadly applicable: 
“The advantages of becoming a technology 
supplier are global reach, scalability, and the 
potential to pursue aggressive market expansion. 
The disadvantages are that success is contingent 
on capturing market share; there is also a 
greater risk of IP infringement. This is our 
preferred approach. 
The advantages of becoming a component 
supplier is the potential for global reach and the 
ability to protect proprietary intellectual 
property. The disadvantage is that market growth 
is dependent on the expansion of the customer 
base, over which we, as a supplier, would have 
no control. 
The owner operator model is relatively low 
risk and has the potential to be profitable with a 
small market position. From the developer point 
of view, however, there are a number of 
disadvantages: limited scalability, slow roll-out, 
revenue streams limited by capacity, and high 
investments in infrastructure. It may also be 
difficult to expand globally.” [42] (Morgen, C., 
Senior manager business development and 
marketing - Inbicon (Dong Energy). 
The early development of corn to ethanol plants by 
farmers’ co-operatives in the US essentially followed the 
owner operator model. Hybrid models are, of course, also 
possible and may form the basis of a business strategy. 
For example, a company may seek to become an owner 
operator in its domestic market and a technology supplier 
in export markets:  
“Our aim is to become a supplier of technology 
worldwide. In some markets e.g Africa, EU, we 
would be a turnkey plant provider. In others we 
would licence the technology.” (Interview: 
Lindstedt, J., Sekab) 
Strategic partnerships. Forming a strategic 
partnerships with another company is another prominent 
strategy. Biogasol, for example, claim that their approach 
is to “work in partnership” and have secured relationships 
with the sugar producer Tate and Lyle and the 
conventional ethanol producer Pacific Ethanol [43]. 
Virent similarly claim that their “commercialisation 
strategy is to collaborate with tier-1 partners: Honda and 
Shell” who along with Cargill are leading investors in the 
company [44]. The oil majors, BP and Shell have a 
number of other partnerships which have already been 
discussed.  
Forming such a partnership has clear advantages: it 
can bolster the confidence of customers and is also a 
pragmatic approach to working with the complete supply 
chain, illustrated by this perspective from Verenium, a 
mid-stream technology developer:  
“[Starting to build a commercial facility] for 
a company like ours is the moment of truth where 
you come face to face with the realities and 
complexities of such an undertaking. You are 
really talking about the development of a whole 
supply chain which starts with the economics and 
goes right through to the development of the 
project itself; along with the technology, how to 
operate it and deliver your product into the 
market”. To work on that entire supply-chain is 
far too much for a single company to do on its 
own and that is what led us to a partnership 
strategy.” [45] (Riva, C., President and CEO, 
Verenium) 
4.3 Insights from companies’ attempts to commercialise 
ethanol  
Work being undertaken by companies to 
commercialise LE encompasses all the technical stages of 
the supply-chain, but must also consider the interactions 
with the realms of policy and finance. This section 
describes some of the most prominent perspectives 
expressed by companies, grouped according to the stages 
of the LE supply-chain – feedstock supply, conversion, 
etc.  
 
Feedstock supply. Obtaining large quantities of low 
cost biomass that is of acceptable quality is one of the 
principle problems facing the scale-up and 
commercialisation of cellulosic ethanol and biofuels 
more generally. This issue is widely recognised:  
“The key to a successful project is securing 
feedstock at a reasonable price… new entrants 
will struggle unless they can lock in a feedstock 
price.” [46] (Peara, T., Alternative Energy 
Finance} 
 
“When we look at the economics, the biggest 
problem is the cost of biomass.” [31] (Skurla. J., 
President, Dupont Danisco Joint Venture} 
 
“To scale up the technology to a commercial 
scale, first and foremost you must be sure of your 
feedstock base, you cannot focus on the 
technology alone” (Interview: Deutmeyer, M.,, 
Choren) 
Those companies that have access to resources also 
recognise the competitive advantage that this confers:  
“We consider that the power in the market is in 
the raw material side. Our principal advantage is 
our privileged access to high volume low cost 
biomass.” (Interview: Hirzman, C., Mondi 
Business Paper) 
Solving the feedstock supply issue has yet to be 
demonstrated in practice. One strategy is to limit the 
production of LE to sites where readily accessible 
feedstocks are available, for example co- products from 
existing processes: 
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“The first proposition is a side door plant – 
next to an existing grain to ethanol plant using 
DDG, and potentially the fibre fraction if this is 
separated out.” (Interview: Martin, S., associate 
R&D director, TMO Renewables) 
This option, however, limits the scale of production. 
Securing access to waste materials may also prove 
problematic: 
“Waste materials are available, e.g agricultural 
residues, but the price will increase if suppliers 
perceive that they are valuable to you. Farmers 
are quite content not to sell if an agreement on 
price cannot be reached” (Interview: Deutmeyer, 
M., Choren). 
The international oil companies are interested in large 
scale production and see strategic partnerships and 
vertical integration as the way forward:  
“The role of strategic partnerships will become 
critical in the case of advanced technologies 
using dedicated energy crops, since this requires 
farmers to move away from producing commodity 
agricultural goods that have a number of 
potential markets to crops that have only one 
market and probably in many cases only one 
customer (due to logistic issues).  Therefore 
vertical partnerships will be a key means to 
mitigate / diversify this business risk.” 
(Interview: IOC#1) 
 
 “Our view is that biofuels are very much an 
integrated play. You have to look at the chain 
from feedstock supply through to product” 
(Interview: IOC#2) 
The Verenium Corporation is one of the companies 
pursuing this option in partnership with British 
Petroleum.  
“Ultimately we are talking about taking very 
large quantities of biomass. How that translates 
for us on the US Gulf cost is energy crops where 
we lease the land and contract for the supply so 
we are able to control the energy crop resource – 
it translates from our analysis into the lowest 
cost, reliable, long term feedstock supply we can 
get in the US” [45] (Riva, C., President and 
CEO, Verenium) 
In the absence of political constraints, considered 
further below, there is a general consensus that the source 
of the biomass should determine the location of the plant: 
“If you look at the volumes of biomass required. 
Then Russia and Canada are interesting 
locations. We don’t believe in transporting 
biomass.”  (Interview: Lindstedt. J., Sekab) 
 
 “At the commercial scale – We have an idea of 
the scale required. Approx 400,000 air dry tonnes 
of chips ~ 65,000 tones of ethanol. This is the 
same order of magnitude as a pulp mill.  The 
most important thing is the biomass cost, and this 
suggests we should locate in South Africa or 
Russia.” (Interview: Hirzman, C., Mondi 
Business Paper). 
Transport of biomass, however, is possible and this 
could potentially lead to the commoditisation of biomass 
feedstocks, which would increase exposure to market 
volatility and reduce further the ability of producers to 
lock-in a profit margin.  Views diverge about how severe 
this risk is in practice:  
“Arbitrage means that price gaps between 
substitutable products [oil and biomass] will tend 
to close. Nevertheless, currently a gap exists and 
I think that it can be maintained. For example: 
pellets are available at €120-180/ton but contain 
the equivalent energy of €300 of fossil fuel. I.e. 
there is a multiple of two.  Conversion technology 
needs to be developed – there is the potential to 
use a huge amount of pellets.  The real sleeping 
giant is co-firing. Coal costs ~€220/ton, and if 
you have to purchase CO2 certificates too, pellets 
are the same cost per GJ.” (Interview: 
Deutmeyer, M., Choren). 
 
 “I don’t think that gap between oil price and 
biomass can be sustained. There are too many 
alternative uses for bioenergy: pellets, electricity, 
etc. The feedstock price will inevitably be 
connected to the oil price. It will however take 
time to build up capacity of other technologies.” 
(Interview: Lindstedt. J., Sekab) 
 
“Whether you can lock in a profit margin, or 
not, depends upon how robust the process is and 
how diversified the feedstock base can be.  If you 
can only use premium quality biomass then you 
are likely to run into problems. If you can use a 
range of biomass qualities, sourced from multiple 
locations, then a profit margin could be 
maintained.  
It is worth making the comparison with an 
oil refinery. A refinery is designed for a specific 
grade of crude oil, and cannot easily be adapted 
to use, for example, sour crude. Biomass is even 
more diversified, and processes that rely on 
fermentation will be especially sensitive. A 
mixture of feedstocks cannot be handled with 
existing processes.” (Interview: IOC#2) . 
Although a strategy of diversifying the feedstock 
base is attractive in theory, it is worth noting that it may 
not be a practical option unless the plant is located close 
to a port. A conversion plant based in a grain growing 
area and designed to use agricultural residues, for 
example the mid-west United States, is unlikely to be 
able to procure softwood at a reasonable price, even if it 
were technically able to use it.  
4.4 Conversion: demonstration, scale-up and integration 
The need to demonstrate the conversion technology, 
scale-up production capacity and integrate production 
with other facilities, are readily identified as common 
strands of companies’ technology development strategies. 
Demonstration and scale-up are closely related, as unless 
you can demonstrate that your technology works at small 
scale, persuading investors to back a larger scale version 
will be difficult. Integration with other facilities is 
attractive because it has the potential to reduce the cost of 
demonstration and may also provide a route to 
commercialisation. 
Demonstration combines both technical and 
commercial objectives. Both are evident in descriptions 
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of the demonstration stage by two Danish companies: 
Dong energy and Biogasol: 
 “Demonstration is to reduce the risk and to 
attract the banks. The purpose of demonstration 
is technology feasibility, but also the commercial 
part, what the technology costs, what are the 
operating costs, and the whole sense of cellulosic 
ethanol as a business. It is also the basis for 
providing process guarantees. Right now you 
cannot go to any technology supplier and ask for 
a process guarantee.”[43] (Langvad, Business 
development manager, Biogasol) 
 
“What we are demonstrating is a small scale 
version of the business: a demonstration of the 
entire value chain. We realised that this was 
necessary because there is a lot of stuff up and 
downstream of our core technology. The issue is 
not to build a demonstration plant without 
technical problems, but to find the technical 
problems and fix them.”  [47] (Morgen, C., 
Inbicon (Dong Energy)) 
Demonstration is most often regarded as one of a 
series of steps required to attain commercial scale. 
Verenium describe the need to scale-up gradually and 
emphasise the importance of learning as you go: 
 “If you are making the leap from a laboratory 
scale tech and turning it into a commercial 
project you need to take a certain number of steps 
to scale-up in a measured and disciplined 
manner. To take the learnings [sic] from each 
step and recycle them back into the research.  
[we have] lab facilities and a small pilot 
plant in Santiago where results from the lab can 
be immediately validated at small scale. We also 
took the step of building a pilot plant in 
Louisiana which we operated for a couple of 
years. Then we took the further step of building a 
demonstration scale plant – sized at 1.4million 
gallons per year. It allows us test feedstocks, 
enzymes, process strategies, develop the 
operating skills and work out some of the 
feedstock supply strategies. All of this represents 
a very valuable feedback loop with the research 
and this is allowing us to make rapid progress in 
working out a commercial strategy. The next step 
is scaling up by a factor of 25 – and building a 35 
million gallon per year commercial size plant.” 
[45] (Riva, C., President and CEO, Verenium} 
The hands-on experience that working at the 
demonstration scale can provide is also considered 
important by the oil companies and other mid-stream 
technology developers. Both as a means of managing risk 
and a source of competitive advantage:  
“It is important not to underestimate how 
important scale-up is. If you are not intimately 
involved in the development and scale-up of a 
process it might look easy, but when you do it, it 
can turn out to be a lot more complicated. In 
practice scale up issues can be significant. Not 
everything scales linearly. As a technologist, 
demonstration provides a way of checking and 
learning. It is a prudent way of checking and 
learning the fine detail. 
Scale up can be difficult unless you can 
afford to bring all the skill you need together. 
Otherwise you may find that you lack a vital part 
of the picture. Large oil companies can do this. 
The corollary is that claims made on a small 
scale are no guarantee of success” (Interview: 
IOC#3) 
“Sekab will be both supplier of technology and 
use cellulose base technology in its own plants. 
We will supply our own facilities with the 
technology first. We believe that developing the 
technology in our own plant gives us an 
advantage over competitors. Poet [a US ethanol 
company] is working on the same basis, aiming 
to use corn stover and fibre in existing corn to 
ethanol plant.” (Interview: Lindstedt, J., Sekab) 
The combining of commercial and technical 
objectives at the demonstration stage also poses a risk. If 
the technology performs less well than anticipated, 
investors and potential customers may lose confidence. 
Managing expectations, therefore, is an important part of 
the commercialisation process. It is notable that the fact 
that a company is demonstrating its technology tends to 
have a high public profile, whereas the results of the 
demonstration tend to be confidential. One major 
European fossil and biofuel provider, trader, distributor, 
and potential customer for a turnkey plant, expressed 
their frustration with the lack of data, progress, and press 
releases designed to manage their expectations:  
“Currently there are no engineering companies 
operating on a sound basis who can offer turnkey 
plant and tell us how well it can perform. There 
are a number of demonstration showcases [both 
in the EU and the US] but for the time being 
nothing is proven. It is also impossible to find out 
anything about how the demonstration plants are 
running, certainly not enough to jump in with an 
investment. Looking at the publications from 
Shell, Iogen, etc., it is evident that a large number 
of improvements are needed to make the 
conversion process feasible. For example, Iogen 
have announced that they have produced and 
sold 180m3 of ethanol to Shell for evaluation 
purposes, [but] after more than 5 years of 
development this is just window dressing.” 
(Interview: IOC#2) 
Integrating LE production with other industrial 
facilities, e.g. a first generation ethanol plant or a 
combined heat and power (CHP) unit, provides an 
opportunity to share utilities, reduce costs and gain vital 
operational experience with considerably less capital 
outlay than building a stand-alone plant. Jan Lindstedt, 
CEO of Sekab’s industrial development business, argues 
strongly in favour of integration:  
“We don’t think that we will have stand alone 
units. Integration with other facilities will be 
essential. Many integration options have been 
proposed, but the principal ones we are 
considering are: integration with pellet 
production, with CHP, with first generation 
ethanol production and, in the longer term, with 
bio-refineries. Operations that add value to the 
co-product streams –lignin and biogas – will also 
be of critical importance.” (Interview: Lindsted. 
J., Sekab) 
17th European Biomass Conference and Exhibition 2009, Hamburg, Germany 
 
The paper company UPM also anticipates that all its 
biofuel projects would be integrated with existing pulp 
mills: 
“The reasons for integration are as follows:  
• significant savings in investment cost – 
wood handling, water treatment etc. are 
already there; 
• the raw material supply chain is in place; 
and can be increased in a cost effective 
way; and, 
• energy efficiency, opportunities to use 
excess heat and integrate other material 
flows. [32] (Sohlstrom, H., UPM) 
The oil companies, however, express divergent views 
about whether stand alone plant will be attainable. 
Jacques Blondy, of the French petroleum company Total, 
believes not: 
“It is hard to imagine a scaled up plant 
working alone. Most today are designed as an 
add-on to conventional ethanol.” [48] (Blondy, 
J., director of agricultural development, refining 
and marketing, Total) 
But another of the international oil companies 
believes otherwise: 
“We are confident that we can go for big plant. 
If you envisage cellulosic ethanol having a 
significant role in future global fuel supply it is 
worthwhile having the ambition to go for large 
scale plant. Also, if you have the world stage to 
say when and where and you are going to 
produce ethanol, there is a clear opportunity to 
have large scale facilities.” (Interview: IOC#3) 
4.5 Retail and distribution 
The downstream infrastructure required to distribute 
ethanol attracts far less comment than the issues of 
feedstock supply or the conversion process. The general 
view of the mid-stream and up-stream companies is that 
this has been shown to work with first generation ethanol 
and that there are no significant technical problems to be 
overcome. One of the oil companies, however, voices 
caution about taking this aspect of the supply-chain for 
granted: 
I wouldn’t underestimate any aspect of the 
supply-chain. There is a risk in assuming that the 
actual distribution network for ethanol is a trivial 
investment. It is not. The existing fuel 
infrastructure has had many million dollars spent 
on research and development to make it work - it 
is easy to underestimate the work that goes on in 
the background. The ultimate success is that no 
one notices, but for those involved it is a day to 
day challenge. (Interview: IOC#3) 
4.6 Ethanol markets and public policy 
Public policy pervades all aspects of the biofuels 
industry. It underpins both the existing market and the 
rationale for future investment: 
“The reality is that we need the subsidy. 
Without it there would be no industry”[49] 
(Plaza, President & CEO, Imperium Renewables 
 
“[The] ethanol price depends not only on the 
supply/demand balance but the interaction with 
policies and regulations. The ethanol market is 
influenced by political decisions, blending 
mandates, restrictions on the maximum 
proportion that may be blended etc. Customs 
tariffs also have a strong influence on the price” 
(Interview: Ethanol marketing manager)   
Arguably, however, it is the propensity to change that 
causes the greatest concern: 
“...clearly oil and feedstock prices fluctuate, but 
the worst factor is policy change. Regulatory 
changes are fast and hard to predict” (Ibid) 
 
“Investors know that everything relies on the 
politics and could change overnight. They need to 
be convinced that there is a stable interest. For 
this reason the EU 10% goal is important. It 
sends a signal that the commitment is genuine.” 
(Interview: Lindsted, J., Sekab) 
The level of policy support not only determines 
whether investments are made, but also where they are 
made. The introduction in the US of the Farm Bill and 
the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) has made the US a 
far more desirable location for investment than the EU. 
This is reflected in companies’ strategies for scaling-up 
and commercialising their technology, and in decisions 
about whether to take an active role in the market at all: 
“Our attitude towards lignocellulosics until 
about 18 months ago was, quite frankly, that it all 
looked quite uncertain: there were many 
pathways, we would take a watching brief, 
perhaps come in and act as an consolidator or 
aggregator or when the time was right. The RFS 
changed that. The RFS made it clear that there 
was going to be a lignocellulosic market in 
America from next year. That meant we moved 
from being happy observer and followers of a 
technology to a firm that decided it needed to be 
market leaders because we could see progressive 
legislation pointing the way.” [50]( New, P., 
Head of Biofuels, BP) 
 
 “We are focussing on the US because it is more 
favourable from a policy point of view…” [31] 
(Skurla, J., President, Dupont Danisco Joint 
Venture) 
 
“If you want to do something in this field you 
had better not be in Europe, you had better be in 
the US.” [51] (deBont, J., R&D Manager, Royal 
Nedalco) 
Financial investors also recognise the importance of 
choosing the most favourable policy regime:  
“if you are looking to get new tech funded, then 
establish a US research subsidiary and go to the 
States” [46] (Peara, T., Alternative Energy 
Finance) 
 
 “The name of the game is to structure the 
finances to tap into public sector funding 
sources” [52] (Gilmore, R., GIC Trading). 
A more detailed critique of the policy environment in 
the EU relative to the US, is provided by Jan de Bont 
from Royal Nedalco. He identifies a range of policy 
hurdles, some general, and some specific to their own 
wheat bran-to-ethanol technology, but likely to be 
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pertinent to all developers planning to use genetically 
modified organisms: 
 “In the EU there are all sorts of problems 
whether you are looking at first or second 
generation feedstocks: 
• free trade – Brazilian alcohol can land in 
Rotterdamn and there is no restriction on 
imports; 
• no EU legislation supporting the production 
of second generation ethanol –all alcohol is 
the same; and, 
• the legislation surrounding GMO’s is also 
very restrictive.  
In our case we want to use wheat bran which 
contains protein [as a co-product] EU legislation 
says that you cannot use this for feed. You can 
apply for a permit but this takes 5/6 years and 
costs several million Euro. You just can’t do it. 
 There are two GMO issues. The first is 
production – which is not too much of a problem. 
The second is what do you do with the protein?. 
You cannot sell it, so you have to make biogas, 
which is difficult because there is a lot of 
ammonia which is an inhibitor to biogas. So, 
your valuable protein, not only are you losing it 
but it is even difficult to convert into biogas.” 
[51] (deBont, J., R&D manager, Royal Nedalco) 
4.7 Finance 
Obtaining finance is essential if companies’ plans to 
develop LE technology are to be realised. At the best of 
times financing a project with a high level of technical 
risk is difficult, and the financial crisis that began in late 
2008 has served to increase uncertainty. The investment 
perspective is concisely summarised by Don Roberts 
from CIBC world markets:  
“Investments in the bio-energy sector are 
driven by four key variables: 
• the price of oil (the main substitute); 
• the price of the feedstock (often 50% or more 
of the cost of production); 
• the conversion technology; and, 
• regulations the stimulate demand.  
Investors hate uncertainty…..and at present, all 
four of these variables are in a state of flux.” 
[53] (Roberts, D., Managing Director, CIBC 
World Markets). 
The collapse in the price of oil has also affected the 
first generation biofuels industry, and in early 2009 
around 20% of the U.S. corn ethanol capacity was 
reported to be idle [54] This idle capacity has the 
potential to overhang the market and depress the ethanol 
price when the market picks up. Experience with first 
generation ethanol has also educated financiers about 
what to look for, and in particular the dangers of 
commodity risk:  
“Many lenders are out of the market due to 
losses on 1st generation ethanol – they won’t 
touch anything labelled ethanol or biodiesel. No 
one wants to take the commodity risk – so unless 
you can hedge this you wont get finance” [55] 
(Peters, J., Managing Director: Project Finance, 
TD Bank N.A.). 
Despite this grim picture, a number of commentators 
express optimism. There is an expectation that oil and 
commodity prices will begin to rise in the next two years 
and that this will positively affect the economics of 
cellulosic ethanol [56]. Government incentive schemes 
are also expected to play a key role [57]. In particular it is 
anticipated that Governments will play a stronger role in 
promoting “good” feedstocks and banning “bad” ones  
[58] In the short term at least, the availability of finance 
and public policy goals and incentives, appear 
inextricably linked. 
 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Insights that may be drawn from review of innovation 
theory presented in the first part of this paper include the 
following points. 
• The path to market for LE is inherently speculative. 
Innovation theory helps frame some of the strategic 
choices facing companies developing LE 
technology, but neither the extent nor the rate of 
technological diffusion (substitution) can be 
predicted on the basis of historical data. 
• Although not possible to predict the rate of 
technological diffusion, general lessons from past 
experience can be identified. In particular, there is a 
general trend that the greater the scale, infrastructure 
requirements and technical interdependence, and the 
lower the relative advantage over the incumbent 
technology, the longer it will take for the technology 
to become established. Applying this to LE suggests 
that the diffusion of LE technology will be a slow 
rather than a fast process.  
• LE is still at the innovation stage, although it 
appears to be entering the niche market 
commercialisation stage. I.e. it is still undergoing 
applied research and development and the market 
share is zero, but investments in niche applications 
and field projects are being made.  
The synthesis of companies’ and investors’ 
experiences and strategies presented in the second part of 
this paper paints a mixed and changing picture. But, 
returning to the overall objective, what can it tell can it 
tell us about the path to market in the short term?  
Many of the companies pursuing LE (and other 
biofuels) are at – or at least claim to be at – a similar 
stage: one where they need to demonstrate their 
technology at intermediate scale and make the leap to a 
first commercial plant. This supports the assertion that 
the next step on the path to market is technology 
validation and demonstration. Yet the fact that companies 
(and investors) with the resources to do so are adopting a 
portfolio approach suggests that a winning technology 
has yet to emerge. Moreover, even if there were such a 
winning technology, the diversity of feedstocks and 
options for integration with other facilities makes it 
unlikely that it would fit all applications. Convergence on 
a small number of routes or technologies must therefore 
be considered unlikely.  
Yet, even without technical convergence it is possible 
to identify elements of common practice, if not best 
practice, for demonstration and scale-up. This includes:  
• prioritising access to feedstocks;  
• being  aware of logistics for both raw 
material and by-products; 
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• developing the technology with a full scale 
plant in mind; 
• being conservative with scale-up, ensuring  
that lessons are learnt at small scale and 
employed at large scale; 
• valuing hands on experience as source of 
competitive advantage; 
• integrating demonstration projects with other 
facilities to reduce the cost and lower the 
risk; 
• pursuing strategic partnerships,  to pool 
knowledge, mitigate risk, but also to 
demonstrate credibility to investors and 
future customers who might be wary of 
working with a small company; and 
• applying reasonable measures to get public 
funding, including choosing the most 
favourable policy regime. 
Running counter to the suggestion to be conservative 
with scale-up, of course, is the need to generate and 
maintain momentum, and to secure the next tranche of 
investment before the cash runs out. The demonstration 
stage, as we have seen, is expensive. Taking a cautious 
approach to scale-up may be less risky, but it will also be 
more costly.  
Another development that may be anticipated is that 
as experience increases, clusters of interest might emerge, 
based around specific resources and applications. The 
formation of strategic alliances is evidently a preferred 
strategy for companies irrespective of their size. The 
cementing of these partnerships may make it difficult for 
late entrants to access the best technology and resources. 
Europe is currently perceived as far less attractive a 
destination for the first commercial plants than the US. 
This could change, but large scale public initiatives 
would be required. In the immediate term, therefore, 
developments in Europe are likely to be limited to early 
stage demonstration, and potentially small integrated 
facilities. 
The number of demonstrations that are planned 
globally is encouraging and holds out the prospect of 
learning, over the next few years, what works and what 
doesn’t. Intrinsic in learning what doesn’t work, of 
course, is the prospect that that some of the proposed 
demonstration plants will fail. Ultimately it should be 
borne in mind that transport fuel, even at the elevated 
prices seen in mid 2008 is a low cost commodity. The 
cheapest and most robust technologies will ultimately be 
the most successful.  
Nothing in the analysis suggest that practical paths to 
market do not exist. On the contrary, there are an 
abundance of options, many of which are being actively 
pursued. The number of companies pursuing second 
generation biofuels is also testament to the conviction 
that commercial opportunities exist. The next few years 
promise to be an exciting and revealing time for biofuels 
and cellulosic ethanol.  
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